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Abstract
I propose an interpretation of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) seen through the ontology of 
Gilles Deleuze. Zhu Xi is one of the most prominent Chinese philosophers, the figure-
head of the so-called Neo-Confucian school, and Deleuze is arguably one of the most 
important Western philosophers of the twentieth century. Both philosophers presented 
an ontology of differentiation, whose main aspects or stages I try to analyse in the paper: 
Deleuze’s notions of the virtual, dark precursor, field of individuation, intensities and the 
actual; and parallel to these, Zhu Xi’s notions of the veins (li 理), supreme ultimate (taiji 
太極), energy (qi 氣), and things (wu 物). It is argued that a Deleuzian (re)interpretation 
of Zhu Xi is possible and that it may open new tools of analysis for studying Chinese 
philosophy as well as create a conceptual space that can bring together concepts and 
practices from different traditions.
Keywords: Zhu Xi, Deleuze, comparative philosophy, ontology, virtual, dark precursor, 
actual, intensities
Deleuzovska reinterpretacija Zhu Xija 
Izvleček
Predlagam novo interpretacijo Zhu Xija 朱熹 (1130–1200) skozi optiko ontologije Gille-
sa Deleuza. Zhu Xi je eden najbolj znanih kitajskih filozofov in osrednji predstavnik tako 
imenovane neokonfucijanske šole, Deleuze pa je nedvomno eden najpomembnejših za-
hodnih filozofov dvajsetega stoletja. Oba teoretika sta ustvarila ontologiji, ki temeljita na 
razlikovanju. Osrednje vidike oziroma stopnje obeh ontologij in ustreznih tipov razliko-
vanja bom analiziral v pričujočem članku. Pri tem se bom osredotočil na Deleuzove ideje 
virtualnega, temačnega predhodnika, polja individuacije, intenzivnosti ter aktualnosti. 
Vzporedno s temi idejami bom obravnaval tudi Zhu Xijeve pojme žil (li 理),  skrajnega 
pola (taiji 太極), energije (qi 氣) in stvari (wu 物). Trdim, da je deleuzovska (re)interpre-
tacija Zhu Xija možna, da nam lahko nudi nova orodja analize za študij kitajske filozofije 
ter da lahko ustvari nov konceptualni prostor, v katerem bo mogoče združevati ideje in 
prakse različnih tradicij. 
Ključne besede: Zhu Xi, Deleuze, primerjalna filozofija, ontologija, virtualnost, temačni 
predhodnik, aktualnost, intenzivnosti
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Introduction1
Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) is one of the most eminent Chinese philosophers, the 
figurehead of the Neo-Confucian school that in the eleventh century, after several 
centuries of Buddhist and Daoist prominence, tried to revive ancient Confucian-
ism, in a manner somewhat similar to the way the Renaissance in Europe a few 
centuries later returned to the ideas of Greco-Roman Antiquity. Another similar-
ity to the Renaissance lies in the fact that although Neo-Confucianism promoted 
Confucianism, it was in fact a strongly syncretistic movement (like its European 
counterpart), having absorbed important influences from Buddhism and Daoism, 
both in theory (for instance, interest in cosmological matters) and practice (for 
instance, “calm sitting” jingzuo 靜坐 meditation). 
It should first be noted that the term “Neo-Confucianism” is a Western notion that 
is not used in Chinese and was not the movement’s autonym. In China, the move-
ment is called “the study of Dao” (Daoxue 道學), “the study of the veins”2 (lixue 
理學) or by some other term. However, the school did intend to revive Confucius’ 
teaching, so the term Neo-Confucianism is not misleading (for further discussion, 
see Makeham 2010, x–xiv). 
Zhu Xi is the most prominent representative of Neo-Confucianism, the leading 
figure of the so-called Cheng-Zhu school (named after the brothers Cheng: Cheng 
Hao 程顥, 1032–1085, and Cheng Yi 程頤, 1033–1107, and Zhu Xi himself). In 
place of a previous, more extensive canon of books, he selected a more reduced 
canon of the “Four Books” (Analects, Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, 
and Mencius) which, together with Zhu Xi’s own comments, were to become the 
basis of Imperial examinations for nearly six hundred years, from 1313 to 1905. 
So, his influence on Chinese philosophy is hard to overestimate.
In his ontology Zhu Xi synthesized the concepts of veins (li 理), energy (qi 
氣)3 and supreme ultimate (taiji 太极) that had been discussed by his prede-
cessors Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073), Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1078), and 
brothers Cheng. Already in Zhu Xi’s lifetime his students and contemporaries 
were puzzled by how exactly veins and energy were related to each other, or 
what was the status of the supreme ultimate, and these questions have remained 
topics of scholarly debate until today. The paper uses Deleuze’s philosophy, 
and more precisely the philosophy of the actualization of the virtual presented 
1 This project was supported by the Estonian Research Council grant PRG319.
2 For this translation of the term, see below, section “Articulation and Energy”.
3 For the translation of this term, see below, section “Articulation and Energy”.
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in the Difference and Repetition (1994), to (re)interpret4 Zhu Xi’s notions and 
their relations. 
The aim of the paper is not so much to show that the Deleuzian concepts in ques-
tion are the “same” as Zhu Xi’s, but rather to show that the two thinkers can be 
brought fruitfully together and that their incongruity due to temporal, spatial and 
cultural differences need not be an obstacle, but on the contrary that these two 
disparate “images of thought”5 might, by their very incongruity, open a sense of 
depth in thought, just as the perception of depth in the visual field is formed on 
the basis of two incongruous images from the two eyes (DR6, 51). This disparity 
between the two cannot be fully worked out in a short paper like this, but what’s 
possible in the limited space might serve as a guiding principle in comparative 
philosophy in general. 
Deleuze’s Ontology: Virtual, Intensive, Actual
One of Deleuze’s great contributions to the philosophy of difference and differ-
entiation was to get rid of the problem of the one and the many (DR, 182sqq). 
To show that the question is not how one becomes many and how the many are 
(or are not) one, but that being is always a multiplicity and that differentiation 
can be described in terms of different types of multiplicity. It is never possible to 
produce multiplicity from the absolute One; all genetic processes must contain a 
multiplicity all along.7 
4 Every interpretation is already a reinterpretation, a new contextualization, so their difference is 
rather of degree than all-or-nothing. 
5 “Image of thought” is Deleuze’s notion and refers to what is already presupposed when one starts 
to think (Lambert 2012, 1). This notion underwent a transformation: while in the earlier books 
Deleuze wanted to propose a “thought without image”, in his later works he rather wanted to pro-
pose a “new image of thought” (see Dronsfield 2012).
6 DR refers to the English translation of Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 1994). 
7 The problem with the “one” and the “many” in the Western tradition is that they are “concepts of 
the understanding which make up the overly loose mesh of a distorted dialectic which proceeds 
by opposition” (DR, 182). The main target is Hegel: being, non-being, becoming, etc.: “Can we 
believe that the concrete is attained when the inadequacy of an abstraction is compensated for by 
the inadequacy of its opposite?” (ibid.) It applies also to Platonic interpretations: the notion of 
multiplicity “denounces simultaneously the One and the many, the limitation of the One by the 
many and the opposition of the many to the One” (DR, 302). Platonic idealism: the One is the 
“same”, and the many are the “similar”, the many represent and resemble the One. Multiplicity, 
instead, replaces both the one and the many, “Everywhere the differences between multiplicities 
and the differences within multiplicities replace schematic and crude oppositions. Instead of the 
enormous opposition between the one and the many, there is only the variety of multiplicity.” 
(DR, 182)
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Deleuze first worked out the idea of different orders of differences in relation to 
Bergson, who had made a distinction between a space-like multiplicity, the ele-
ments of which are juxtaposed with each other, and a duration-like multiplicity, 
the elements of which interpenetrate each other. It is not a distinction between 
space and time, but between chrono-metric spacetime, whose metric lies outside 
of the elements involved (e.g. yardstick, a chronometer), and durational-top-
ological spacetime, where the elements contain their metric in themselves. In 
the first case the distances and intervals are defined by some conventional unit, 
in the second case what matters is the type of relations between the elements 
(ordinary and singular points; saddles, nodes; etc.; see also DeLanda 2002). The 
first is the objectified space-time, the second is an experienced spacetime. It is 
clear that the elements I perceive in my surroundings or that I can distinguish in 
the memory of my temporal existence are not outside each other but form a field 
with an inner articulation whose elements are defined by their relations: every 
passing moment forms a whole with the rest of my memory (the Bergsonian 
“memory cone” that involves all my past experience) and every element of my 
perceptual field has relations to others (for instance, being on the foreground or 
background, being attractive or repulsive, eliciting certain interactions like a cup 
on my table, etc.). 
Against this Bergsonian background, Deleuze creates a more detailed account of 
differentiation in the Difference and Repetition. The basis of differentiation is a 
virtual multiplicity that Deleuze describes in terms borrowed from mathematics. 
The virtual multiplicity has differential elements (e.g. phonemically relevant fea-
tures like voiced/voiceless, labial/dental/guttural, etc.) that are reciprocally deter-
mined in differential relations (for example, the structure of all the relevant pho-
nemic relations) that form singularities or attractors (phonemes). Deleuze calls 
this state of multiplicity (e.g. phonemic differences) perplication (for different 
“plications” see DR, 280–81).
 It might be argued that formally similar occurrences of the One and the Many in the Chinese tra-
dition―for example Laozi §42 (cited below, section “Background in Chinese Tradition: Genesis 
by Differentiation”): “one begets two, two beget three, three beget the myriad things”––sit in a 
different context. First of all, the one is not primordial, but itself engendered by Dao. And so it 
symbolizes everything that appears, is manifest––but which always presupposes the non-apparent, 
the non-manifest. Second, the one is conceived as full of potentialities: it does not externally create 
the many, but has the many in itself in an interpenetrating fashion (cf. also below, section “Energy 
(qi 氣) and the Intensities”). Or, better, “one”, “two”, “three” and “myriad things” in Laozi are all 
multiplicities, different phases of a multiplicity. There was no need to stress the “sameness” of the 
One; on the contrary, the latter was conceived of as being in a continuous transformation or change 
(only the fact of changing does not change).
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The actualization process of this virtual multiplicity begins with a “dark precur-
sor”8 (see DR, 119–122). The latter puts into communication two series of dif-
ferences, two series that are incompatible, incongruous. It is the “differenciator 
of differences”. It is the reverse of an identity or communality (hence the desig-
nation “dark”). And like the stepped leader is followed by a visible lightning, so 
also the ensuing individuation covers up the dark precursor; the differenciator 
of differences is buried under similarities and identities, and under the extensive 
quantities and qualities.
The actualization takes place on a field of individuation. Just as Bergson’s memo-
ry cones together form a giant memory of the universe (at least in Deleuze’s inter-
pretation; see, for instance, Deleuze 1991, 100), so also all things and events share 
the virtuality, but every one of them actualizes only a small portion of it, which it 
takes as its field of clarity, while the rest is left in obscurity. So, for example, my 
field of individuation as a human being involves things of a certain scale (usually 
from millimetres to meters and perhaps some kilometres, from milliseconds to 
a couple of decades), certain types of objects (that notably include cultural arte-
facts), etc. Some events in the world might be in very close relation to myself, for 
example the metabolism in the billions of cells of my body, but they nevertheless 
form only an obscure background to my existence, an indistinct white noise from 
which occasionally some clear voices emerge, such as when a sufficient number 
of cells express their need for nutrients and I experience hunger. The same ap-
plies to the “outer” experience. For example, the clear perception of the sound of 
the sea involves an infinite number of “small perceptions”, the sounds of all the 
different particles of water which I am normally unable to hear distinctly. It can 
be said generally that every perception is a contraction of smaller events, like also 
each body itself is a contraction of certain physiological and biochemical events, 
and those contractions are made in terms of the field of individuation involved. 
What is distributed in a field of individuation are intensities, spatio-temporal dy-
namisms that unfold the virtual relations. The differences in the case of intensity 
are not wholly internal and reciprocal as in virtuality, but not yet wholly exter-
nalized either, so that its terms still interpenetrate each other. We can take as an 
example the experience of duration or spatial perception mentioned above. In my 
perceptual field I certainly distinguish parts as external to each other, but I cannot 
8 Deleuze takes the notion of “dark precursor” from thunder research. In English the corresponding 
scientific term would be “stepped leader” (“dark precursor” is a literal translation of the French 
term précurseur sombre, and this literal translation is used in the English translation of Difference 
and Repetition). Before the visible lightning strikes, there is an invisible stream of ions from the 
cloud to the earth, and when it reaches the ground, the visible lightning occurs, following the path 
drawn beforehand by the stepped leader.
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dissect my perceptual experience in the manner I can dissect a thing. The same 
applies in the case of my duration: it has elements in a relation of before and after, 
but my whole past experience inheres in every part in such a way that I cannot 
dissect parts out of it. Or to put it more correctly, in a certain way I can divide 
my perception and memory, in the sense of taking a closer look, zooming in, but 
then, by this very act, the whole changes; “no part exists prior to the division and 
no part retains the same nature after division” (DR, 237), its “metric varies with 
division” (DR, 238). 
Finally, the actual is formed by fully unfolding or explicating the intensities to 
form extensive quantities and qualities. This process can, by imagination, be ex-
trapolated so that we may conceive of a pure spatiotemporal juxtaposition (com-
plete externality of spaces and moments) whose parts are completely homogene-
ous, so that division (or duration) is completely indifferent to them. And this step 
has indeed been taken often in the Western metaphysical tradition, where space is 
conceived of as a contiguity of parts and time a succession of moments. But real 
systems always contain some heterogeneity of elements, and the intensities are 
never completely cancelled out under extensive parts and qualities. 
Those different levels are simultaneous; each thing has, as Deleuze says, a “virtu-
al half” and an “actual half”, and the individuation takes place in-between. This, 
of course, is not only a question of creating differences, but also of unmaking 
them; there also occurs a destruction and metamorphosis of actual structures. An 
attitude of counter-actualization is even an important existential technique. But I 
shall not discuss this topic in the present paper.9 
Background in Chinese Tradition: Genesis by Differentiation
Genesis-by-differentiation is deeply ingrained in Chinese philosophy. The par-
adigmatic passage is §42 of Laozi: “Dao begets one, one begets two, two beget 
three, three beget the myriad things (道生一，一生二，二生三，三生萬物).” 
Compare this to another Daoist classic, Zhuangzi, describing the genesis of a 
human being: “Mingled together in the amorphous, something altered, and there 
was the energy; by alteration in the energy there was the shape, by alteration of 
the shape there was the life (雜乎芒芴之間，變而有氣，氣變而有形，形變
而有生)” (Graham 1981, 124). There is the understanding that (1) the genesis 
proceeds by differentiation, (2) the actualized products do not resemble those 
interpenetrating phases they are differentiated from.
9 I have done so in another paper, see Ott 2019.
287Asian Studies VIII (XXIV), 2 (2020), pp. 281–310
This seems close enough to some pre-Socratic philosophers who also describe 
genesis by differentiation, and specifically, as in the case of Empedocles, through 
two opposing forces like Love and Strife (cf. the Chinese polarity of yin-yang). 
Later, this idea was changed with the introduction of a Demiurge in Plato’s Ti-
maeus and the Christian God, which introduce the notion of entities transcending 
the process involved and superior to it. Deleuze does away with this supplemen-
tary dimension, and his account of actualization by differentiation is closer to 
traditional Chinese accounts of genetic processes.10
The following application of Deleuze to Zhu Xi is thus rather “safe” in the sense 
that both speak of the same thing. My main goal is to show that the particulars 
of the respective descriptions can also be fruitfully made to bear on one another. 
Articulation and Energy
Zhu Xi developed a philosophy of li 理 and qi 氣. Before looking more closely at 
Zhu Xi’s texts, however, let us consider the two terms themselves.
In his translation of Zhang Dainian’s Key Concepts of Chinese Philosophy (2002), 
Edmund Ryden provides the following account:
The term li originally meant the lines running through a piece of jade. It 
came to prominence as a philosophical term during the Warring States 
period. It is then often translated as “pattern”. By the Song dynasty it 
rose to become the most important metaphysical concept and hence is 
generally translated as “principle”. (Zhang 2002, 26–27)
In what follows, I would like to keep the older meaning present while interpreting 
Zhu Xi: li as the veins in a jade or (an example more familiar to Westerners) in 
marble.11 Philosophically, it denotes the articulations of a thing or an event.
10 It may also be noted that whereas some of the most dominant metaphors in the West come from 
pottery and herding, the most dominant metaphors in China come from gardening or grain cultiva-
tion, from seeds and plants (see Munro 2015, 130–32; Zhang 2002, 83). This also favours thinking 
in terms of differentiation, as we can observe the latter in the development of a seed into a plant 
(while the maturation of the foetus of a mammal is more hidden). On the other hand, pottery seems 
to fit a hylomorphic way of thinking: how to implement a form or an idea to a relatively homoge-
neous mass.
11 In searching for alternatives for “principle” one could also consider other words, like “pattern” or 
“structure”. But I would like to reserve the first term for translating wen 文 in the old texts, and the 
latter has connotations of rigidity or abstractness that are both alien to Zhu Xi’s thought. Instead, 
veins are flexible and are naturally meant for something to flow in them.
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The second concept, qi, is explained by Edmund Ryden as follows: 
Perhaps the best translation of the Chinese word qi is provided by Ein-
stein’s equation E = mc2. According to this equation matter and energy 
are convertible. (…) Qi embraces both. (…) In popular parlance qi is 
applied to the air we breathe, steam, smoke, and all gaseous substances. 
The philosophical use of the term underlines the movement of qi. (…) Qi 
is the life principle but is also the stuff of inanimate objects. As a phil-
osophical category qi is originally referred to the existence of whatever 
is of a nature to change. (…) It is energy that has the capacity to become 
material objects. (Zhang 2002, 45–46). 
Qi is often left untranslated or sometimes translated as “life-breath”, but as Ryden 
explains, it is not limited to animate beings. Wing-tsit Chan translates it as “ma-
terial force” (Chan 1963, 784), which is a rather strange rendition (are there any 
other forces than material? what matter would correspond to the yin qi 陰氣 or 
yang qi 陽氣?). In what follows, I shall translate it simply as “energy”, although 
it should not be equated with the energy in the physical sense. 
It is easy to understand how an ontology can be made around the concepts of 
veins and energy, because every phenomenon has a certain articulation and a 
certain energy or movement, and it can be applied both to physical and psy-
chological phenomena. A proton is made up of three quarks, that is, has the 
articulation of two up-quarks and one down-quark. It also has an energy (that is 
partially expressed by its mass). Or psychologically: an idea, memory, yearn-
ing, etc., all have an articulation and also an inherent striving, movement or co-
natus, that drives them to the next moment, and then to the next, thus securing 
their duration.
It can also be argued that an energy without articulation could not manifest itself 
in any way, because all appearing requires that the appearing something must have 
an inner articulation that also makes it distinct from the rest (the inner differences 
of an entity and the difference of the entity itself from the outside are strictly si-
multaneous, with one presupposing the other). On the other hand, an articulation 
without energy is also inconceivable: because epistemologically speaking even a 
most abstract structure presupposes a subject that is holding it in her mind, and 
this holding is a temporal process that implies a certain energy, striving, conatus, 
etc. Speaking ontologically: an articulation that is not connected to any energy 
remains a pure virtuality without any actuality. 
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Zhu Xi and the Veins
By making a connection between Deleuze’s virtuality and Zhu Xi’s concept of 
the veins, I do not mean to say that they are the same, but rather that the concept 
of the veins could be fruitfully interpreted in Deleuzian terms. There are some 
considerations that warrant such interpretation. 
First, the notion of the veins appears in the context of an account of differenti-
ation. As said above, differentiation is the mainstream ontology in the Chinese 
tradition, probably first developed in the Daoist context and later accepted by 
Confucianism and, to some extent, even by Buddhism. The veins play a key role 
in explaining differentiation, as does the virtual in Deleuze. Zhu Xi explicitly 
says that the differentiations of the veins are different (其分不同) (Yulei 6, 5b; 
QS 14, 23712). 
Second, the veins are called “minute” wei 微 (“the most minute is called the 
veins” 至微者理也); this is reminiscent of the Deleuzian virtual which is said to 
be made of differential relations that are infinitely small. Incidentally, “differen-
tial relation” in modern Chinese is translated as weifen guanxi 微分關係, with 
the same word wei as for “minute”. Of course, differential calculus did not exist 
in the 12th century China, but there is an idea of invisible minute differences that 
through unfolding become macroscopic and visible. This idea can be extrapolated 
or abstracted even by a naive mind while observing the development of a seed, 
where in the beginning it is hard or impossible to apprehend any differences with 
the naked eye, but because we know that distinctions are developed from it, we 
can infer that there must have been former invisible minute differences in the 
seed.13 
Third, the veins are immanent. Like the energy (which is related to the intensities, 
as discussed below) they “depend on each other and never separate from each 
other (常相依而未嘗相離也)” (Yulei 94, 19b; QS 17, 3128–29), “in the world 
there is no energy without veins, and no veins without energy14 (天下未有無理之
氣，亦未有無氣之理。氣以成形，而理亦賦焉)” (Yulei 1, 2b; QS 14, 114). It 
is also immanent both to the “images” (xiang 象, which denotes an intermediary 
level of actualization): “inside the images there are the veins, and there is no 
12 Two references are given for Zhu Xi citations: (1) from the traditional Qing dynasty Siku quanshu 
edition, with the number of the chapter and page (a or b side), (2) from Zhuzi quanshu (Zhu 2002, 
abbreviated as QS), with the number of the volume and page.
13 Deleuze also relies heavily on embryology in his description of differentiation (DR, 214–19, 237–
38, 249–51).
14 The translations from the first juan of Zhuzi yulei are from Patrick Edwin Moran’s draft translation 
(Zhu 2003), but have been modified somewhat. 
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distance between them (象中有理，是無間也)” (Wenji 40, 41b; QS 22, 1841) 
and to the “things” (wu 物, which denotes the level of the actual): “there is noth-
ing that does not have these veins (莫不各具此理)” (Yulei 18, 15b; QS 14, 606). 
There is, though, a properly Chinese distinction of “above the forms” (形而上) 
and “among the forms” (形而下).15 The veins are said to belong to the former 
(“the veins are above the forms (理形而上者)” (Yulei 1, 3b; QS 14, 115)), while 
actual things and events (shiwu 事物) belong to the latter (“form” here designates 
all actual things with a form and can be taken more or less simply as a synonym 
for “thing”). But it would be very misleading to take the “above the forms” in the 
sense of a Platonic realm of ideas that transcends the sensible things.16 Both are 
invisible (“the veins cannot be seen (理不可見)” (Yulei 94, 17a; QS 17, 3126)), 
but the Platonic invisible forms belong to a completely different realm than the 
sensible and they can only be apperceived with the eye of the mind or reason, 
whereas the invisible veins in Neo-Confucianism still very much belong to our 
world. So, the “above” in both cases implies a completely different metaphor: the 
Platonic ideas are “above” as reason is above the body and the gods are above 
the humans, while the Neo-Confucian “above” refers to small streams flowing 
here and there in the hills, and only when they move downward do they acquire 
a more definite form of a river. Philosophically, they denote the “upstream” and 
“downstream” levels of a process of actualization.17 
One of the main obstacles in this comparison is that Zhu Xi refers to the veins 
as “one”: “the veins are one18 (liyi 理一)” (Yulei 1, 2b; QS 14, 114); it is the first 
part of the famous phrase “The veins are one and its differentiations are many (liyi 
fenshu 理一分殊)”. What are we to make of this? According to Deleuze’s dis-
tinction, we could interpret the “one” of the veins as completeness, not as whole-
ness: the virtual is complete, but not whole. In the virtual, there is the reciprocal 
15 The term originates from the Xici 繫辭 (Appended Statements) commentary to the Book of 
 Changes. The Xici commentary or The Great Commentary (which is not a systematic commentary, 
but an independent text compiled from different sources) was composed between the 4th and 2nd 
centuries BC. It was later considered as an integral part of the Book of Changes, making up two of 
its “Ten Wings”. The Xici commentary is the most philosophical part of the Book of Changes, and 
when a philosopher cites the Book of Changes, very often the source is the Xici. 
16 Incidentally, the Western term for “metaphysics” has been translated into Chinese as “the study 
of the above-the-forms” (形而上學), which is quite misleading (or which involves an important 
reinterpretation of the term). 
17 François Jullien uses the French terms en amont (“upstream”) and en aval (“downstream”) to ex-
plain this Chinese conception and employs them as concepts (Jullien 2004, 42, 116 et passim). It 
should also be noted that Jullien has done pervasive work with Deleuzian inspiration with different 
aspects of Chinese tradition (although he rather seldom acknowledges the loans or the similarity). 
18 There is no grammatical number in Chinese, so the choice of singular or plural in the translation is 
often arbitrary.
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co-determination of differential relations and the complete determination of how 
singular points are distributed; however, the virtual is just one part of the object, 
the other part being its actualization (see DR, 46–47, 208–11). In Zhu Xi the 
movement of the energy depends on the structure of the veins: “If yin and yang, 
and five phases intertwine, without losing their sequence, this is the veins (如陰
陽五行錯綜不失條緒，便是理)” (Yulei 1, 4b; QS 14, 116). So, the complemen-
tarity of the different modes of energy (yin and yang, five phases) could be seen 
as based on the reciprocal determination in the veins and also on the complete 
determination of singular points that are folded out in the intensive processes of 
actualization of the energy. 
Status of the Veins
The relation between the veins and other phases of actualization (first of all, en-
ergy), already puzzled Zhu Xi’s own students, who asked their master about it 
several times, and it has remained a topic of scholarly debate ever since. To begin 
with, Zhu Xi strongly affirms that they are inseparable: “In the world there is no 
energy without veins, and also no veins without energy (天下未有無理之氣，
亦未有無氣之理)” (Yulei 1, 2b; QS 14, 114), “the veins are never separated from 
the energy (理未嘗離乎氣)” (Yulei 1, 3b; QS 14, 115). But on the other hand, 
he accords priority to the veins19: “the veins are before (先有理)” (Yulei 1, 2a; 
QS 14, 114 and elsewhere); “when there are veins there is immediately also the 
energy, but the veins are the root (有是理便有是氣，但理是本)” (Yulei 1, 2b; 
QS 14, 114); “In the final analysis, before there was either heaven or earth there 
were first these veins (未有天地之先，畢竟是先有此理)” (Yulei 1, 1a; QS 14, 
113). Still, it should not be considered as a temporal priority: “you cannot say 
that today there are such-and-such veins and tomorrow there is such-and-such 
an energy (不可說是今日有是理，明日卻有是氣)” (Yulei 1, 5a; QS 14, 116). 
The veins “are not separate, yet do not mix” (buli buza 不離不雜, as says Qing 
dynasty scholar Lu Longqi 陸隴其, 1630–169220): they are ontologically distinct, 
but not separable. 
However, when we try to look more closely into their relation, we are met with 
difficulties. There are passages where Zhu Xi seems to affirm that “the veins pro-
duce the energy (理生氣21)” or that “the energy is produced by the veins (氣(…)
19 There are other ontologies that stress the priority of the energy, for example Zhang Zai 張載 
(1020–1077), Wang Tingxiang 王廷相 (1474–1549), Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692). 
20 See https://www.kanripo.org/text/KR4f0040/001#1a (1.6b).
21 See https://www.kanripo.org/text/KR5i0079/001#txt (1.6a). 
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是理之所生)” (Yulei 4, 26a; QS 14, 200), thus making the veins prior in a strong-
er causal sense. In this case the veins (as equivalent to Deleuze’s virtual) would 
initiate the activity of differenciation.22 But taking into account certain factors 
(rarity of appearance, lesser authoritativeness of the texts, the general framework 
of his philosophy), scholars usually tend to think that it doesn’t refer to production 
in a chronological or causal sense, but rather means the actualization “according 
to” the veins, in the sense that the energy unfolds the “minute” and “above-the-
forms” differences of the veins (see, for instance, Yang 2015; Chen 2016). In yet 
another passage, Zhu Xi says that “the veins are above yin and yang like a man 
riding a horse (理搭在陰陽上，如人跨馬相似)” (Yulei 94, 17; QS 17, 3126), 
which according to the metaphor would imply that the veins have directive power 
over the energy.
Still, in another and more developed text, Zhu Xi says that the veins are “without 
any will or intent, without any ability to plan, without the ability to bring anything 
into existence (無情意，無計度，無造作)” (Yulei 1, 5a; QS 14, 116); are only 
“a sterile and empty world that does not contain a single trace (則只是箇淨潔空
闊底世界，無形跡)” (ibid.); (“trace” in the sense of something detectible, al-
ready actualized). According to this, the veins by themselves do nothing. Zhu Xi 
explains that it is the energy that gives a “place” to the veins, an anchoring point, 
so to say. “Yet the veins are not a separate entity. They exist amid the energy. If 
there were not this energy, then the veins would have no place to which to hook or 
from which to hang (然理 又非別為一物，即存乎是氣之中：無是氣，則是
理亦無掛搭處)” (Yulei 4a; QS 14, 115); “when energy does not consolidate, then 
the veins have no place in which to inhere (若氣不結聚時，理亦無所附著)” 
(Yulei 4b; QS 14, 116). 
There is a similar scholarly debate about the relation of the virtual and intensive 
in Deleuze: which of them should be considered as the preferred ontological lev-
el? Some would stress the virtuality (Badiou 1999, 43–54; Ansell-Pearson 2002, 
99, 111; Hallward 2006, 28) and see it as the source of activity; others stress the 
intensities (Hughes 2009, 142; Bowden 2017, 236; Lundy 2017, 183) and say that 
the virtual is just a structure that by itself does nothing. The quotes from Zhu Xi’s 
in the previous paragraph are closer to the latter interpretation; however, the pas-
sages in which the veins are said to produce the energy could be taken to support 
the former interpretation.
It might be useful to distinguish between priority by initiation and priority by 
beginning. The intensities are what initiate actualization because they are the first 
22 Deleuze distinguishes between “differentiation” in the virtual itself and its “differenciation” of the 
virtual into actual forms (DR, 207). 
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stages of it. But this actualization unfolds virtual differential relations and singu-
lar points, which are the beginning of an actualization. In Deleuze’s words: “The 
nucleus and the genes designate only the differentiated matter––in other words, 
the differential relations which constitute the pre-individual field to be actualised; 
but their actualisation is determined only by the cytoplasm, with its gradients and 
its fields of individuation” (DR, 251). So, the actualization of a cell begins from 
the DNA, but is initiated by the cytoplasm. 
Dark Precursor and the Supreme Ultimate
In Deleuze, the very beginning of actualization is with the dark precursor that 
brings together different orders of differences and makes them resonate. In Zhu 
Xi a somewhat similar role is played by the supreme ultimate (taiji 太極). The 
term was made famous by the Xici 繫辭 commentary of the Book of Changes:
In change there is supreme ultimate, which generates the two modes. The 
two modes generate the four images, and the four images generate the 
eight trigrams. (Adler 2015, 39, translation modified)
易有太極，是生兩儀，兩儀生四象，四象生八卦。
The term became popular in Daoist circles and was introduced into the Song 
dynasty’s Neo-Confucian philosophy by Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦頤 short text the Ex-
planation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate (Taijitu shuo 太極圖說) that 
opens as follows: 
Without ultimate and yet the supreme ultimate! The supreme ultimate 
through movement generates yang. When its activity reaches its limit, 
it becomes tranquil. Through tranquillity the supreme ultimate gener-
ates yin. When tranquillity reaches its limit, activity begins again. So, 
movement and tranquillity alternate and become the root of each other, 
giving rise to the distinction of yin and yang, and the two modes are thus 
established. (Chan 1963, 463, translation modified)
無極而太極。太極動而生陽，動極而靜，靜而生陰，靜極複動。
一動一靜，互為其根。23
23 The Chinese original is available at the Chinese text project, see http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=g-
b&chapter=942058.
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In both cases the supreme ultimate appears in the context of a cosmological and 
ontological account of differentiation, at the very outset of actualization, in the 
position before the differentiation of the energies of yin and yang. As Zhu Xi 
says: “Supreme ultimate’s cleavage is just yin and yang, and it comprises all the 
things under heaven (太極分開只是兩個陰陽，括盡了天下物事)” (Yulei 94, 
1a; QS 17, 3115). 
There is some ambiguity in Zhu Xi. On the one hand, he equates the supreme 
ultimate with the veins: “The supreme ultimate is just the veins of heaven, earth, 
and the myriad creatures (太極只是天地萬物之理)” (Yulei 1, 1a; QS 14, 113) 
and even more bluntly, “The supreme ultimate is just the word ‘veins’ (太極只是
一箇「理」字)” (Yulei 1, 2a; QS 14, 114).
The supreme ultimate is just the veins of heaven, earth, and the myriad 
things. Speaking with regard to heaven and earth, then within them there 
is the supreme ultimate. Speaking with regard to the myriad things, then 
within them there is the supreme ultimate in each of them. Before there 
was heaven or earth there must have been first the veins. In moving it 
produces yang, and this is also veins. In being still it produces yin, and 
this is also veins. 
太極只是天地萬物之理。在天地言，則天地中有太極；在萬物
言，則萬物中各有太極。未有天地之先，畢竟是先有此理。動而
生陽，亦只是理；靜而生陰，亦只是理。(Yulei 1, 1ab; QS 14, 113)
But in another place, there is a dictum, where Zhu Xi says that the supreme ulti-
mate is energy:24
Ten thousand things, four seasons and five phases come just from the 
supreme ultimate. The supreme ultimate is just one energy. By proceed-
ing it differentiates itself and makes the two energies. Among them the 
moving (energy) is yang and the quiescent (energy) is yin. By again dif-
ferentiating, it creates the five energies and then scattering it becomes the 
ten thousand things.
24 In the Qing dynasty edition of Master Zhu’s Complete Works (1714) this citation (49.9b) was 
placed immediately after the previous one, although it certainly comes from a different time and 
context. Master Zhu’s Complete Works actually was not the complete works and it should not be 
confused with the modern edition of complete works that I am usually referring to in this paper. 
I shall refer to this old edition as Quanshu. The electronic version of the chapter is available at 
https://www.kanripo.org/ed/KR3a0108/WYG/049.
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萬物四時五行只是從那太極中來。太極只是一個氣，迤邐分做兩
個氣。裏面動底是陽，靜底是陰，又分做五氣又散為萬物。(Yulei 
3, 14a; QS 14, 163)
Although there are many citations supporting the idea that the supreme ultimate 
belongs to the veins, it is clear that it cannot be simply identified with them, be-
cause the supreme ultimate is creating, generating, “moving”. Explaining Zhou 
Dunyi, Zhu Xi says:
“By moving it begets yang and by being still it begets yin”. “Moving” 
is the supreme ultimate’s moving and “being still” is the supreme ulti-
mate’s being still. When it moves, it then begets yang and when it is still, 
it then begets yin, it produces the energy of this yin-yang. 
‘動而生陽，靜而生陰’，動即太極之動，靜即太極之靜。動而後生
陽，靜而後生陰，生此陰陽之氣. (Yulei 94, 4a; QS 94, 3118)
But no such movement can be attributed to the veins. Zhu Xi accepts Zhou Dunyi’s 
interpretation that the supreme ultimate generates yin and yang. It constitutes the 
very first distinctions: “If there were no taiji, then heaven and earth would not 
fold themselves out (若無太極，便不翻了天地！)” (Yulei 1, 2a; QS 14, 114).
So, we might conclude that the supreme ultimate is close to the veins, but already 
one step towards actualization. Let us now take a closer look at the metaphor 
involved. The term taiji is composed of two parts: tai 太 “very big”, “great”, “su-
preme” (more emphatical than simply da 大 “big”) and ji 極, which usual mean-
ing is “extreme”, “very”, “utmost”. Rao Lu 饒魯, a student of Zhu Xi’s principal 
student, explains the term as follows: 
The term taiji expresses the majesty of the universal pattern (tianli 天理, 
“heavenly veins”). The word ji means axis or pivot (shu 樞), knot or node 
(niu 紐), root (gen 根), or basis (di 柢); as we say in common speech, 
shuji 樞極 (axis), or genji 根極 (root). (…) The word tai 太 means so 
great that nothing can be added, and expresses the fact that it is the Great 
Pivot and the Great Basis of the universe. All things, however, which 
bear this name, such as the North (celestial) Pole, the South (celestial) 
Pole, the ridge of a house (wuji 屋極), the Capital of Shang, or the four 
compass-point directions, have visible forms and locations to which we 
can point, but this ji alone is without form, and has no relation to space. 
Master Zhou therefore added the term wu 無 (wuji 無極), expressing the 
fact that it is not (confined to) any form such as that of a nodal pivot or a 
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basic root, yet nonetheless is really the Great Nodal Pivot and the Great 







According to these different metaphors, taiji is the highest tip (like a ridgepole), 
the deepest or furthest point (tip of a root), the innermost centre (pivot) of every 
single thing, and also of the universe as a whole. It is the incipient stage or point of 
a thing, a quasi-nothingness. Indeed, according to a classical Chinese saying from 
the Laozi, the wheel is understood to rotate around a nothingness: “Thirty spokes 
join one hub. The wheel’s use comes from emptiness (三十輻，共一轂，當其
無，有車之用)” (Lao-Tzu 1993, 15). Although the focus of Laozi’s dictum is 
elsewhere (that you need a hole in the middle of the wheel where to put the axle 
and thus to make the wheel “usable”), it was also understood more generally that 
the centre or pivot of the very being is a “nothingness”. Of course, Daoism is 
something Zhu Xi wants to clearly distance himself from (and therefore also he 
downgrades the importance of the notion of wuji26 “without ultimate”), but this 
background of the notion of the supreme ultimate might serve our purpose here to 
make a connection with Deleuze’s dark precursor, because both refer to the very 
beginning of individuation. In this sense we might agree with everything Joseph 
Adler (2015) says in his thorough discussion on the translation of taiji––that it is 
a generating point of a thing/event27 and that things and events always manifest 
themselves in polarities (two ends of a thing,28 two phases––yin and yang––of 
a process)––with the exception of Adler’s conclusion that, for that reason, taiji 
should be translated as “Supreme Polarity”. What engenders polarity is itself not 
polar; every polarity belongs already to the sphere of the energy, intensities. Taiji 
is not a polarity (even a supreme one), but rather the negative of a polarity (in 
25 The Chinese original is available at https://www.kanripo.org/text/KR3a0078/001#1a (1.19ab).
26 According to Zhu Xi, Zhou Dunyi simply wants to stress with this term that the supreme ultimate 
is not a thing. But historically it seems more plausible that the wuji referred to a level of existence 
before taiji, perhaps some kind of primordial chaos. 
27 “Like a pivot point, it is dimensionless yet constitutes the central axis of change and differentia-
tion.” (Adler 2015, 62)
28 Indeed, the common word for “thing” in contemporary Mandarin is dongxi 東西 that literally 
means “east-west”, referring to the polar constitution of everything. 
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the photographic sense of the “negative”), like Deleuze’s invisible dark precursor 
which draws “in the negative” the path that the visible lightning will take. 
This would enable us to finally surpass the fruitless aporias of the one and the 
many that are present both in Zhu Xi himself and his interpreters, right up until 
today.29 It would be better not to consider the supreme ultimate as a somehow 
condensed duality or polarity, because this would mean that its two parts already 
belong together and have some similarity, thus imposing on it the fourfold yoke 
of representation (DR, 34, 264), subjecting the difference to the identity of the 
relation and the similarity of its parts. It would be better to consider the supreme 
ultimate as a dark precursor, a non-thing that brings together two different sets of 
differences, or, to put it in different linguistic terms, the place where two different 
sets of differences come together and enter into resonance, forming a system that 
will maintain in itself this paradoxical instance of the dark precursor that serves 
as the generating point of the system. 
Field of Individuation and the Supreme Ultimate
There is another aspect of the supreme ultimate that draws it nearer to another 
one of Deleuze’s notions, namely the field of individuation. Zhu Xi distinguishes 
between two modes of the supreme ultimate that are called weifa 未發 and yifa 
已發. Fa 發 literally means “send forth”, “emit”, “release”, “shoot” (e.g. an ar-
row), “express”, “open”, “expose”. The two expressions thus mean, respectively, 
“not yet emitted (expressed, exposed, etc.)” and “already emitted”. The first aspect 
is closer to the veins or the virtual, the latter to the intensities. According to another 
common Chinese metaphor that sees quiescence, tranquillity or stillness as more 
primordial than movement, Zhu Xi also relates weifa to stillness and yifa to activi-
ty: “Not-yet expressed is taiji’s stillness and already-expressed is taiji’s movement 
(未發者太極之靜,已發者太極之動)” (Quanshu 49, 19b). The actualization is 
seen as a movement from the not-expressed to the expressed: it “flows and moves 
in the phase of the already-expressed and is held in reserve at the occasion of the 
not-yet expressed (流行於已發之際，斂藏於未發之時)” (Quanshu 49, 13b).
29 “Zhu Xi understood taiji to be the most fundamental cosmic ordering principle, which is, to be 
specific, the principle of yin-yang polarity. In other words, the simplest, most basic ordering prin-
ciple in the Chinese cosmos is the differentiation of unity into bipolarity (not duality). Wuji er 
taiji (無極而太極, ‘without ultimate and yet supreme ultimate’), then, means that this most fun-
damental principle, bipolarity—despite its evident ‘twoness’ and its role as the ultimate source of 
multiplicity—is itself, as a rational ordering principle, essentially undifferentiated.” (Adler 2015, 
68) It does not help if “duality” is simply replaced by “bipolarity”. It is not possible to generate a 
universe from “one” or from the “undifferentiated”, but only from a virtual multiplicity. 
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So, while the supreme ultimate’s state of not-yet-expressed or emitted might be 
related to Deleuze’s dark precursor (which is exactly the point of starting to emit, 
express, resonate, individuate), the supreme ultimate’s state of already-expressed 
might be related to Deleuze’s field of individuation. If according to one aspect 
of the metaphor of the supreme ultimate or extreme it can be seen as the genetic 
starting point of an individual and as the dark precursor, then according to another 
aspect of the same metaphor it can be seen, by synecdoche of pars pro toto, a part 
standing for the whole of the thing, as the condensation or concentration of an 
individual. As Chen Chun 陳淳 (1159–1223) says: 
The greatest extent of anything is always in its centre. Things from all 
directions reach their ultimate point here and cannot go any further. Take 
the ridgepole of a roof. It is called the wuji (屋極) (terminus of a building). 
It is simply the converging point of all building materials from the various 
directions, reaching their terminus at this centre. (Chen 1986, 117)
蓋極之為物，常在物之中，四面到此都極至，都去不得。如屋脊
梁謂之屋極者，亦只是屋之眾材，四面湊合到此處皆極其中。30
There is something of a “converging point” also in Deleuze’s notion of the field 
of individuation. In that part of his ontology he relies heavily on Leibniz, who 
describes individuals in terms of viewpoints: 
Just as the same city viewed from different sides appears to be dif-
ferent and to be, as it were, multiplied in perspectives, so the infinite 
multitude of simple substances, which seem to be so many different 
universes, are nevertheless only the perspectives of a single universe 
according to the different points of view of each monad. (Leibniz 1989, 
Monadology §57, 648)
Although the metaphor is not the same (more “physical” in Zhu Xi, and more 
“epistemological” in Leibniz), they share an order of implication of differences 
or distinctions: in Chen’s citation, the ridgepole implies all its materials, while 
Leibniz’ viewpoint of a monad implies the sensible multiplicity of a city, brought 
together in a “metaphysical point” and made to interpenetrate there.
What is more, the different fields of individuation in Deleuze/Leibniz, as well as 
the supreme ultimates of every being/event in Zhu Xi, involve all the other beings 
and the whole world. Only a portion of the virtual relations is expressed clearly in 
a field of individuation; the rest remains implied in obscurity. Zhu Xi says:
30 The Chinese original is available at https://www.kanripo.org/text/KR3a0107/010#1a (10.3a).
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Fundamentally there is only one supreme ultimate, yet each of the myr-
iad things has been endowed with it and each in itself possesses the su-
preme ultimate in its entirety. This is similar to the fact that there is only 
one moon in the sky but when its light is scattered upon rivers and lakes, 
it can be seen everywhere. It cannot be said that the moon has been split. 
(Chan 1963, 638, translation slightly modified)
本只是一太極 ,而萬物各有稟受 ,又自各全具一太極爾。如月在
天，只一而已，及散在江湖，則隨處而見，不可謂月分也。(Yulei 
94, 71ab; QS 17, 3167–68)
So, all the supreme ultimates imply or involve each other. Supreme ultimates are 
immanent to each individual, they imply each other and remain differentiated: 
The ten thousand things differentiate the reality of the one vein system 
and take it as their rhizome-body (ti 體)31 and therefore among the ten 
thousand things, every one has a supreme ultimate, but small and big 
things all have a certain distinction. 
一理之實，而萬物分之以為體，故萬物之中，各有一太極，而小
大之物，莫不各有一定之分也。(Yulei 94, 71a; QS 17, 3167)
This way of individuation by differentiation32 makes it possible to overcome the 
traditional Western analysis by genus, species and individuals that still hampers 
31 Ti 體 is one of the key concepts of Chinese philosophy (see Gedalecia 1974). It forms a pair with 
yong 用, “function”, “application”, “use”, and refers to the “above the forms”, while function is 
“among the forms”. Ti has been translated as “essence” or “substance”, but these Western con-
cepts, with a long history and strong connotations, are rather misleading here (in Wang Yangming, 
Iso Kern tries to distinguish ti according to these two notions, i.e., Wesen and Substanz, but I do not 
find his analysis particularly convincing, see Kern 2010, 189–94), because it does not form a pair 
with the inessential or accidental but is formed on the basis of the logic of differentiation, as the 
virtual level of things and events. Etymologically ti means “body”, and Deborah Sommer (2008), 
who has analysed different Chinese notions of the body, has pointed out that the ti-body is a kind 
of rhizomatic body. Of course, Zhu Xi does not here refer to any notion of Deleuze’s rhizome, and 
in other places uses traditional tree metaphors. But even in the tree metaphor, the emphasis lies 
elsewhere: while in the West, it has been mostly used to stress the hierarchic relationship––some 
things are more basic than the others, like the trunk and the branches––in China the emphasis lies 
rather on the differentiation––the trunk differentiates itself into branches and branches into leaves 
(in a “upstream” and “downstream” relation), and if the roots have a certain priority, it is because 
they come before in the order of differentiation. 
32 See also Quanshu (49, 16a): “The supreme ultimate is like the root that produces what is above, 
differentiates itself into the trunk and branches, and then again produces flowers and leaves, pro-
ducing and reproducing (shengsheng 生生) without exhausting (太極如一本生上, 分為枝幹, 
又分而生花生葉, 生生不窮).”
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interpreters.33 The beings thus actualized are not subject to any requirement of 
identity in the concept or similarity in realization. It would be better not to see the 
“one” of the veins or of the supreme ultimate as a reference to identity, but to (re)
interpret it as a virtual multiplicity that unfolds into actual beings. 
Energy (qi 氣) and the Intensities
Energy stands for the next step in the process of actualization. It belongs to the 
realm of “among the forms (形而下)” (Yulei 1, 4a; QS 14, 115); it is “coarse” 
(cu 粗) and contains sediments, dregs or residue (zhazi 渣滓) (ibid.). This means 
that it is capable of accumulating (ji 積) and coagulating or condensing (ningju 
凝聚) into matter or stuff (zhi 質).34 It is this coagulation or condensation that 
gives veins a “place” (chu 處), as we mentioned when discussing them; that is, 
an anchoring point, so that energy can be channelled into its different branches, 
specific to every being and event. Without this anchoring point, the veins would 
remain ineffective; it is energy that gives them the capacity to actualize, and once 
in contact with the energy, the veins direct their actualization process. Zhu Xi 
compares the situation to a seed:
It is just in this way that in the entire world in the case of humans, crea-
tures, vegetation, and beasts, there are none that are born without a seed. 
There is certainly no possibility of a thing or an event being born on a 
featureless plane from no seed whatsoever. All of this is energy. In the 
case of the veins there is only a clean and pure, empty and broad world 
without forms and traces. It cannot produce anything. But energy can 
ferment, coagulate, and bring forth things. But if there is this energy, 
there are the veins to be found within it. 
33 For instance, it distorts Kirill Thompson’s otherwise very insightful description of Zhu Xi, when he 
says: “Qi bodies forth an object’s presence and yields specificities of its peculiar tangible traits; li is 
relatively implicit for it gives the inherent patterning that yields the kind of object and its range of 
typical responses and interactions. Qi gives the particular stuff of the object and thus its distinctness 
and uniqueness vis-à-vis other things of the same kind” (Thompson 2015, 153). Here, it seems as if 
the veins give the specific form to a being, while the energy differentiates between individuals, just 
as matter has often been held responsible for the individual differences within the same species. This 
kind of analysis still moves under the fourfold yoke of representation, under the presupposition of the 
identity within the concept (here, species), and similarity in the physical expression (individuals). 
34 “First there are heavenly veins and yet there is also energy. Energy accumulates and becomes stuff, 
and the nature is concretely present therein (先有箇天理了，卻有氣。氣積為質，而性具焉)” 
(Yulei 1, 2b; QS 14, 114); the term translated as “nature” xing 性 refers to the virtual aspect of a 
being and belongs to the sphere of the “veins”; “Energy can ferment, coagulate, and bring forth 
things (氣則能醞釀凝聚生物也)” (Yulei 1, 5a; QS 14, 116).




氣，則理便在其中。(Yulei 1, 5a; QS 14, 116)
The two most important characteristics of energy, according to Zhu Xi, are move-
ment and transformation. The movement of energy has two basic aspects, yin and 
yang, or rest and movement (so that energy in a deeper sense is the movement of or 
alternation between rest and movement). Zhu Xi often cites the Xici commentary 
of the Book of Changes: “A yin and then a yang is called the Way, and what gives 
continuity to it is good (一陰一陽之謂道，繼之者善也)”, where the “continuity” 
is “the end of rest and the beginning of movement (靜之終，動之始)” (Yulei 1, 3a; 
QS 14, 115).35 Continuation and alternation are two important aspects of energy: 
“If there were just an opening out followed by a closing in, but no continuation, 
then (the process) would be stifled (若只一開一闔而無繼，便是闔殺了)” (ibid.). 
Movement and stillness are equiprimordial: before rest there is movement, and be-
fore movement there is rest, endlessly. 
(Alternations between) movement and rest are without an end, and (al-
ternations between) yin and yang are without a beginning; so, it is not 
possible to distinguish between former and later. For the moment I will 
address myself to the place of origination to speak of it. Before move-
ment there is, after all, rest (...), before yang there is yin; yet before (...) 
rest there is movement. What should be taken as prior and what as pos-
terior? One cannot simply say that today’s movement is taken to be the 
beginning and neglect to mention the rest that was there yesterday. Take 
breathing for instance, if we say huxi (exhale-inhale) then it sounds right; 
we cannot say xihu (inhale-exhale).36 But before exhalation there is, after 




順，不可道吸呼。畢竟呼前又是吸，吸前又是呼。(Yulei 1, 1b; QS 
14, 113–14)
35 The idea of a differential between rest and movement is later developed by Tan Sitong (Tan 1984, 
chap. 15). 
36 That is, the word for “respiration” in Chinese is a compound word where by convention the exha-
lation is mentioned first; to say it in reverse order is incorrect linguistically but would be equally 
correct with regards to the phenomenon referred to.
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It is also important that Zhu Xi rejects any easy identification of the veins with the 
“one” and energy with “many”: 
When we discuss the one origin of ten thousand things, then the veins is 
the same and the energy differs; if we look at the different rhizome-bod-
ies of the ten thousand things, then they are close according to their ener-
gy, whereas the veins are definitely not the same. Energy can be different 




異。(Wenji 46, 12b; QS 22, 2130). 
Differences in the energy and in the veins have consequences on both the moral 
and ethical plane: for instance, a sage’s energy is purer than that of a “small per-
son” (xiaoren 小人). This also explains man’s superiority over animals: it is not a 
difference of nature, but of degree (in purity and wholeness).37 However, a more 
detailed discussion of Zhu Xi’s moral psychology lies outside the scope of this 
paper. 
Although the description of intensities by Deleuze and that of energy by Zhu Xi 
are certainly not identical, it still holds that both refer to the creation of spatiotem-
poral structures, and that during this process the mutual interpenetration of differ-
ent individualizing factors decreases and spatiotemporal juxtaposition increases, 
so that, indeed, the beings (coagulate). Zhu Xi distinguishes a separate phase 
here, one that precedes the completely actualized things, namely the “five phas-
es”38 (wuxing 五行): wood (mu 木), fire (huo 火), earth (tu 土), metal (jin 金), and 
water (shui 水). Usually, the term qi, or “energy”, is applied both to yin-yang and 
to five phases, but Zhu Xi sometimes makes the distinction where he reserves the 
37 The Brothers Cheng, whom Zhu Xi often cites, use the metaphor of river to explain the purity of 
energy or lack of it: a river is pure when it comes from the fountain, but some rivers soon become 
muddy, while others remain pure until they reach the sea. Zhu Xi also uses another metaphor: “The 
activity of production by transformation is like a grindstone wheel which rotates on and on without 
stopping. The production of the myriad creatures is like things being thrown off from the wheel, 
some things are coarse, and some things are fine, and (the process) is naturally uneven (造化之
運如磨, 上面常轉而不止. 萬物之生, 似磨中撒出,有粗有細, 自是不齊)” (Yulei 1, 11b–12a; QS 
14, 121). While there is a normativity here, which is alien to Deleuze, the intensive processes are 
described as naturally different, which is a common trait with him.
38 They used to be translated as “five elements”, due to some similarity to Greek four elements, but 
these systems are very different. The Chinese wuxing 五行 comprises the word xing 行 “to move”, 
“to walk”. And those five “movements” are seen in a dynamic relation of production and overcom-
ing (which is why they can be seen as “phases” of a process).
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term qi only for yin-yang and terms the five phases as zhi 質 “stuff”, “matter”.39 
In any case it is clear that they represent a further step of actualization by their 
greater number (five instead of two) and by their more concrete content (wood, 
fire, etc.; although, of course, these terms do not refer only to the empirical wood 
or fire, but to a certain quality of processes and things). 
We could take the yin-yang as a symbol of the heterogeneity of the series of dif-
ferences brought together by the dark precursor or not-yet-emitted taiji. It is easy 
to construe the yin-yang in terms of oppositions: submissive-dominant, cold-hot, 
dark-light, etc. But through Deleuze’s lens we could consider these oppositions 
as the covering over of a deeper disparity. Those opposites or complementary 
aspects should be regarded not as primordial, but as derived, that is, produced in 
the process of actualization and of the cancellation of difference under qualities 
and quantities. 
It may also be repeated here that, at every step, Zhu Xi stresses the mutual imma-
nence of different levels of actualization: “in the world there is no energy without 
veins, and no veins without energy (天下未有無理之氣，亦未有無氣之理。氣
以成形，而理亦賦焉)” (Yulei 1, 2b; QS 14, 114); “in moving, energy relies on 
these veins, and when energy coagulates, then veins are also in it (此氣是依傍
這理行,及此氣之聚，則理亦在焉)” (Yulei 1, 4b–5a; QS 14, 116). Energy is the 
impetus of a thing or a process and the veins are its articulations. 
Actualized Things
The final stage of an actualization process is the actual things and events. There 
are different terms for this in Chinese: wu 物 “thing”, wanwu 萬物 “ten thousand 
things” (that is, all things), shiwu 事物 “events and things”, xing 形 “form”, qi 器 
“utensils” (considered in a very broad sense that every being is a “utensil” of the 
Dao), and others. As we saw above, already the energies belong to the “among 
the forms” (xingerxia 形而下); this holds even more true for the actualized 
things. Here, the word “form” refers to a metrical form, a being that has become 
39 “Yin and yang are energies. The five phases are stuff. It is necessary to have stuff to bring out 
things and events. Although the five phases are stuff, they also (each) have their own energies, 
by means of which they make these things and events. But it is the two energies of yin and yang 
themselves that differentiate and produce the five phases. It is not the case that outside of yin and 
yang there are five phases that have a separate existence (陰陽是氣，五行是質。有這質，所以
做得物事出來。五行雖是質，他又有五行之氣做這物事，方得。然卻是陰陽二氣截做這五
箇，不是陰陽外別有五行)” (Yulei 1, 13b; QS 14, 123). Zhu Xi also says that yin and yang take 
each other as a substrate or stuff: “Yin takes yang as its stuff, and yang takes yin as its stuff (陰以
陽為質，陽以陰為質)” (Yulei 1, 16a; QS 14, 125).
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spatio-temporally juxtaposed to others and temporarily stabilized; it should not be 
taken in the sense of form as opposed to matter. 
At this final stage of actualization, the interpenetration ceases, and self-identity 
is formed:
“A thing is something that if it moves, then it is not still, and if it is still, 
then it does not move”. It is called an implement among-the-forms. It 
is among the forms and therefore cannot interpenetrate, so that when it 
moves, then its stillness disappears, and when it is still, its movement 
disappears. Like water is just water and fire is just fire. Or in case of 
people, when she speaks, she is not silent, and when she is silent, she 
does not speak. Or in case of things, if it flies, it is not a plant, and if it is 




言之，飛則不植，植則不飛是也。 (Yulei 94, 61a; QS 17, 3160)
We see that, far from being a grounding and starting principle, self-identity is the 
very last “thing” to form, concealing the virtual multiplicity and putting a stop to 
mutual interpenetration. It is only now that water is just water, A=A, a naked rep-
etition. Of course, this is only partially or relatively true, because there are always 
some processes of counter-actualization. 
A person certainly has movement inside stillness and stillness inside 
movement; it is also called a thing. When we talk about things we refer 
to the fact that the form and implement has a certain rhizome-body, but 
it has inside itself a change and interpenetration. It must be kept in mind 
that an implement is also the Way and the Way is also the implement,40 
no implement can be taken separately from the Way. This is the rule for 
all things. Like this bamboo chair here is certainly an implement, and 




便有個道在其中。 (Yulei 94, 63a; QS 17, 3161–62).
40 This echoes the famous Buddhist saying from the Heart sutra that form is emptiness and emptiness 
is form. 
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From the Western tradition, Deleuze’s ontology seems to be well suited to de-
scribe the different Chinese notions for actualized things. It shows how each one 
of them has its supreme ultimate and veins immanent to them, as a singular entity, 
and also how they, to a certain extent, still interpenetrate each other. The iden-
tity of a form or of an idea is not presupposed, but forms during the process of 
actualization.
Mutual Aid
The Deleuzian interpretation of Zhu Xi presented in this paper can be beneficial 
to the research into both philosophers, and it may be useful not only in the realm 
of philosophy, but also as in a wider realm of cultural communication. 
First, this interpretation could help to explain some classical problems in the ex-
egesis of Zhu Xi (for instance, the relation between veins and energy, or between 
the supreme ultimate and veins or energy). This analysis can also be broadened 
to other domains of Zhu Xi’s thinking, like his analysis of heart/mind (xin 心), 
nature (xing 性) and feelings (qing 情) that are related to his ontology of veins and 
energy,41 or to his methods of counter-actualization, like enlargement of knowl-
edge (zhizhi 致知), investigation of things (gewu 格物), quiet sitting (jingzuo 
靜坐), seriousness (jing 敬), and others. Furthermore, a similar analysis could be 
applied to other Chinese philosophers that have a philosophy of differentiation as 
their background (that is, to most Chinese philosophers). 
Deleuze’s philosophy, on the other hand, would gain though this comparison new 
areas of relevance and at least some scholarly debates (for instance, the debate of 
the primacy of the virtual versus that of the intensities, mentioned in section “Sta-
tus of the Veins”) in Deleuzian studies could be related to debates in the Zhu Xi 
studies. Deleuze has already had great influence in the research into affect, em-
bodiment and art (e.g. Sauvagnarges 2013). The new areas of relevance, opened 
by the connection with the Chinese tradition (e.g. intensities and qi 氣), could 
also help to elucidate certain Deleuzian concepts (e.g. the Body-without-Organs).
Second, it can be useful for more general cultural communication and the crea-
tion of a new self-understanding. Let me provide an example. The topic of mind 
and body continues to be an object of heated discussions, and although it is both 
philosophically and scientifically clear that a strong dualism of mind and body is 
not a viable theory, this dichotomy still strongly influences our attitude towards 
41 So that the nature corresponds to the veins, feelings to the energy and the heart/mind is an 
intermediary notion. This introduces the topic of subjectivity and adds further details to the scheme.
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ourselves and our bodies, towards medicine and the ways of and reasons for doing 
sports, yoga or tai chi, etc. As I have often found with my students, if a Westerner 
is pushed to make explicit her folk theories, she still tends to present some form of 
Platonism, with clear dichotomies of mind and body, inextensive and extensive, 
one and many, etc. However, upon closer scrutiny, these views turn out to be both 
philosophically and scientifically untenable.42
Instead, it would be more fruitful to consider our psychophysical being as a mul-
tiplicity that is simultaneously played out on different levels: virtual, intensive, 
actual. And if we adopt this kind of Deleuzian ontological framework we can 
also, with the help of the interface presented here,43 make a fruitful connection to 
Chinese concepts and practices. In the present paper, a bridge was built to Zhu 
Xi’s ontology, but it may also be connected to certain practices, like wushu 武術 
or qigong 氣功, which, among other notions, make use of the concept of qi 氣. As 
already hinted above, this notion has posed serious problems to Western under-
standing. What is it? Is it psychological or material? This (false) dichotomy has 
several negative consequences. For example, if it is conceived as something ma-
terial, it may give occasion to futile efforts to detect it with some apparatus. And 
if the apparatus fails to detect it, then it may be pronounced irreal and inexistent. 
On the other hand, qi may be considered as something mystical, a completely 
unexplainable power, which can lead to an unscientific and even anti-scientific 
worldview. 
Instead, within the framework of a Deleuzian ontology this kind of dichotomy 
of mind and body disappears. There is a psychophysical multiplicity on different 
levels of interpenetration/juxtaposition, and qi can be considered the “energy” 
with which one’s psychophysical reality or “veins” are actualized. It is neither 
physical nor psychic, nor is it psychophysical without differentiation; instead, it 
is both physical and psychic, yet simultaneously unfolds on different levels of in-
terpenetration, and with varying power of actualization. In this way, for instance, 
taijiquan 太極拳 or qigong may help the practitioner to enhance her power of 
actualization, without the need to become a reductionist materialist or a reduc-
tionist mysticist. 
In practical terms, it may help to overcome, on the “somatic” level, both the “cult 
of body”, in the sense of fetishizing a certain (actualized) form of the body, and 
42 Philosophically, the Cartesian dualism was immediately overcome by Spinoza’s monism and has 
since never ceased to be overcome in various different ways (Deleuze’s work may be counted 
among them). Scientifically let me just mention the Embodiment Theory (see Shapiro 2014) and 
the work of Antonio Damasio (1994), among numerous others. 
43 And elsewhere, like in the work of F. Jullien (2004) mentioned above.
307Asian Studies VIII (XXIV), 2 (2020), pp. 281–310
the contrary “neglect of body” (cf. Wang 2010), and, on the “intellectual” level, 
both the “cult of knowledge”, in the sense of idolatrizing knowledge for knowl-
edge’s sake, and the “despising of knowledge”, which has spread recently in the 
post-factual world. What is central, are not the actualized bodily or intellectual 
forms (or empty and simply nihilistic reactions against them), but the “energy” 
to produce forms and the “veins” that are implied in them. Our main attention in 
self-cultivation and social practices should take place on those two ontological 
levels, in order to be able to create better personal and social forms. This is also 
related to the topic of counter-actualisation (undoing existing actual forms in order 
to make new ones, cf. Sholtz 2016) that I have discussed elsewhere (Ott 2019).
In order to achieve this fruitful resonance between traditions, proper philosophi-
cal work is needed, because there is no common ground between modern science 
and Chinese self-cultivation techniques. It is necessary to search for their onto-
logical underpinnings, so that through their incongruity or disparity an ontologi-
cal depth would open, as mentioned at the beginning of the article. With the help 
of this conceptual space, philosophies and practices from different traditions can 
be utilized.
Conclusion
In this paper, I analysed some key concepts of Zhu Xi’s ontology in terms of 
Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy. In particular, I interpreted the veins (li 理) in terms 
of the virtual; the supreme ultimate (taiji 太極) in the state of “not yet emitted” 
(weifa 未發) in terms of the dark precursor and in the state of “already emitted” 
(yifa 已發) in terms of the field of individuation; the energy (qi 氣) in terms of the 
intensities or spatio-temporal dynamisms; and the various terms for things (wu 物 
“thing”, xing 形 “form” or qi 器 “utensils”) in terms of actualized things. There are 
some distinctions between stages of actualization (for example, between yin-yang 
陰陽 and the “five phases” wuxing 五行) that do not appear in Deleuze, and the 
correspondences are certainly not exact, but there is a general homology in their 
descriptions due to the subject matter itself, namely the logic of differentiation. 
I describe Zhu Xi’s account of differentiation on its different levels and aspects: 
(1) the veins being enveloped into (2) a supreme ultimate and unfolded from 
(3) the stage of not-emitted to already-emitted, (4) through the bipolar action of 
yin-yang and (5) fivefold interaction of the five phases to (6) the ten thousand 
‘coagulated’ things. I then argue that it can be (re)described in Deleuzian terms 
of the actualization of (1) a virtual multiplicity, (2) the unfolding of differential 
relations and singular points, through (3) the action of a dark precursor, on (4) 
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fields of individuation, through (5) spatio-temporal dynamisms to (6) actualized 
beings and events. Of course, it should be borne in mind that these phases are not 
(only) successive, but that the virtual and actual are two halves of a thing and that 
there are no veins or energy separated from things, and vice versa. 
Finally, the potential mutual support between Deleuze and Zhu Xi was briefly 
laid out, both in the sphere of philosophy and in that of intercultural communica-
tion. A philosophical conceptual work can create a “space” in which one can in-
scribe elements from different traditions that otherwise have no common ground, 
and hence no relevance to each other. 
References
Adler, Joseph A. 2015. “On Translating Taiji.” In Returning to Zhu Xi: Emerging 
Patterns within the Supreme Polarity, edited by David Jones, and Jinli He, 
51–82. New York: State University of New York Press. 
Ansell-Pearson, Keith. 2002. Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual. Lon-
don, New York: Routledge. 
Badiou, Alain. 1999. Deleuze: The Clamor of Being. Translated by Louise Burch-
ill. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Bowden, Sean. 2017. “The Intensive Expression of the Virtual: Revisiting the 
Relation of Expression in Difference and Repetition.” Deleuze Studies 11 
(2): 216–39.
Chan, Wing-tsit. 1963. A Source Book of Chinese Philosophy. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
Chen, Chun 陳淳. 1986. Neo-Confucian Terms Explained. Translated by Wing-
tsit Chan. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Chen, Shunfu 沈顺福. 2016. “About Zhu Xi’s ‘li Produces qi’ 论朱熹的’理生
气’.” Zhongguo zhexue shi 中国哲学史 (History of Chinese Philosophy) 3: 
70–77.
Damasio, Antonio. 1994. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human 
Brain. New York: Putnam.
DeLanda, Manuel. 2002. Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy. London, New 
York: Continuum.
Deleuze, Gilles. 1991. Bergsonism. New York: Zone Books.
——. 1994. Difference and Repetition, (DR). New York: Columbia University 
Press.
Dronsfield, Jonathan. 2012. “Deleuze and the Image of Thought.” Philosophy 
Today 56 (4): 404–14.
309Asian Studies VIII (XXIV), 2 (2020), pp. 281–310
Gedalecia, David. 1974. “Excursion into Substance and Function: The Develop-
ment of the t’i-yung Paradigm in Chu Hsi.” Philosophy East and West 24 (4): 
443–51.
Graham, Angus. 1981. Chuang-Tzu. The Inner Chapters. London: Mandala. 
Hallward, Peter. 2006. Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Crea-
tion. New York: Verso.
Hughes, Joe. 2009. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Reader’s Guide. Lon-
don: Continuum.
Jullien, François. 2004. Treatise on Efficacy. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press. 
Kern, Iso. 2010. Das Wichtigste im Leben. Wang Yangming (1472–1529) und 
seine Nachfolger über die ‘Verwirklichung des ursprünglichen Wissens’ 
致良知. Basel: Schwabe.
Lambert, Gregg. 2012. In Search of a New Image of Thought. Gilles Deleuze and 
Philosophical Expressionism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Lao-Tzu. 1993. Tao Te Ching. Translated by Stephen Addiss and Stanley Lom-
bardo. Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1989 (1956). Philosophical Papers and Letters. 
Edited and translated by Leroy E. Loemker. Dordrecht-Boston-London: 
Kluwer.
Lundy, Craig. 2017. “Tracking the Triple Form of Difference: Deleuze’s Berg-
sonism and the Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible.” Deleuze Studies 11 
(2): 174–94. 
Makeham, John. 2010. “Introduction.” In Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian 
Philosophy, edited by John Makeham, ix–xiii. London: Springer.
Munro, Donald J. 2015. “Unequal Human Worth.” In The Philosophical Challenge 
from China, edited by Brian Bruya, 121–58. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Needham, Joseph. 1956. Science and Civilisation in China, vol. II. “History of 
Chinese Scientific Thought”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ott, Margus. 2019. “Deleuze and Zhuangzi: Actualization and Counter-actualiza-
tion.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 315–35.
Sauvagnarges, Anne. 2013. Deleuze and Art. London, New York: Bloomsbury.
Shapiro, Lawrence, ed. 2014. The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. 
London, New York: Routledge.
Sholtz, Janae. 2016. “Dramatization as Life Practice: Counteractualisation, Event 
and Death.” Deleuze Studies 10 (1): 50–69.
Sommer, Deborah. 2008. “Boundaries of the Ti Body.” Asia Major 2 (3): 293–324.
Tan, Sitong. 1984. An Exposition of Benevolence. Hong Kong: Chinese Univer-
sity Press. 
310 Margus OTT: Deleuzian (re)inTerpreTaTiOn Of zhu Xi
Thompson, Kirill. O. 2015. “Opposition and Complementarity in Zhu Xi’s 
Thought.” In Returning to Zhu Xi: Emerging Patterns within the Supreme 
Polarity, edited by David Jones, and Jinli He, 149–76. New York: State Uni-
versity of New York Press.
Wang, Robin. 2010. “The Virtuous Body at Work: The Ethical Life as Qi 氣 in 
Motion.” Dao 9: 339–51.
Yang, Lihua 杨立华. 2015. “Revisiting Zhu Xi’s Thought on the Movement and 
Quiescence of li and qi’ 朱子理气动静思想再探讨.” Yunnan daxue xuebao 
(shehui kexue ban) 云南大学学报 (社会科学版) (Journal of Yunnan Uni-
versity (Social Sciences Edition)) 1: 53–56.
Zhang, Dainian. 2002. Key Concepts of Chinese Philosophy. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 2002. The Collected Works of Master Zhu 朱子全書, (QS). Shang-
hai: Guji chubanshe.
——. 2003. “Draft Translations of Segments from the Zhu Zi Yu-lei (Classified 
Conversations of Master Zhu).” Translated by Patrick Edwin Moran. http://
users.wfu.edu/moran/zzyl_TOC.html.
